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We examine the determinants and consequences of changes in hedge fund fee structures. 
We show that fee changes are asymmetric with much greater incidence of fee increases 
compared to fee decreases. We find that managers of younger and smaller funds are more 
likely to increase fees after good performance. Investors view the fee increases following 
good performance as a signal of managerial ability only to be disappointed by their worse 
future performance. Taken together, these findings are consistent with opportunistic 
behavior of emerging fund managers in expropriating surplus from their investors. 
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A significant body of literature has examined the implications of the incentive-
based compensation structure of hedge funds for their future performance and risk-taking 
behavior (see for example, Ackermann, McEnally, and Ravenscraft (1999), Brown, 
Goetzmann, and Ibbotson (1999), Liang (1999), Edwards and Caglayan (2001), Hodder 
and Jackwerth (2007), Chakraborty and Ray (2008)). However, all studies on hedge 
funds with the sole exception of Schwarz (2007) treats hedge fund compensation as fixed 
once an investment is made. In this paper, we obtain unique historical data on changes in 
the hedge fund fee structure including changes in the management fee, incentive fee, and 
high-water mark provision, between April 2008 and November 2010 to examine the 
following research questions: 
  What are the determinants of fee changes? Are there specific determinants for 
changes in the various components of the hedge fund fee structure, namely 
management fees, incentive fees, and the high-water mark provision? How do these 
changes relate to each other and to a fund’s past performance, flows, and other 
characteristics? 
  What are the effects of the changes in hedge fund fee structure on (a) future 
performance, (b) risk-taking behavior, and (c) capital flows from investors? 
The first part of our paper relates to the determinants of changes in the fee 
structure of hedge funds. We identify four different motivations for the fee changes:  
First, fee changes can be used as a mechanism to adjust the incentives of hedge 
fund managers. In case of mutual funds, Christoffersen (2001) shows that funds tend to 
increase (decrease) their fees after good (poor) performance in order to make their net-of-3 
 
fee returns look better and to better align manager payouts and fund performance. If such 
incentive-adjustment mechanism is prevalent in hedge funds, fee changes should be 
positively related to past performance.  
A second motivation for fee changes is the response of the fund managers to 
inflows or outflows from funds’ investors. Christoffersen and Musto (2002) show that 
following poor performance and some investors withdrawing money, mutual funds 
increase their fees for the remaining price-insensitive investors. In contrast, Bris et al. 
(2009) show that well-performing funds that close for new investment to constrain more 
inflows, tend to increase their fees at the time of closing the fund.  
In case of hedge funds, there are restrictions to withdraw capital in the form of 
lockups and extended redemption periods. Hence, a priori, there is less incentive to use 
fee changes as a way to restrict outflows. Depending on which, if any, of these two 
effects are present in hedge funds, we would expect fee changes to be negatively or 
positively related to past fund flows.  
A third motivation for fee changes can be in the form of managers expropriating 
the surplus from the investors by increasing the fees after good performance but not 
decreasing fees after poor performance.  
Finally, a fourth and last motivation for fee change can be related to managers 
learning about their abilities over time where younger and smaller funds start with lower 
fees and then increase them following good performance. 
Our major findings related to the determinants of fee changes are as follows. First, 
we find that fee decreases are less likely to occur in hedge funds compared to fee 
increases. In other words, fee changes in hedge funds tend to be asymmetric. Second, we 4 
 
observe that younger and smaller funds typically starting with lower initial management 
fees and incentive fees tend to increase their fees after superior performance, consistent 
with managerial learning.
1 Finally, we find fee increases to be associated with superior 
past performance and little evidence of fee decreases after poor performance. Taken 
together, these findings suggest that the fee-change phenomenon is mainly driven by 
younger and smaller funds that tend to increase their fees following superior performance 
but do not decrease their fees after worse performance. 
The second part of our paper examines how future fund performance, risk-taking 
behavior, and flows relate to the fee changes and to the different types of fee changes. 
Extant hedge fund literature (Chakraborty and Ray (2008), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 
(2009), Panageas and Westerfield (2009), and Ray (2010)) shows that hedge fund 
compensation contract provides incentives for both exerting effort to improve future 
performance as well as incentives to engage in risk-shifting behavior. Therefore, any 
changes in the fee structure should have implications both for the future performance and 
risk-taking behavior. The investors should also take these effects into account while 
making their investment decisions and therefore fee changes should also be associated 
with changes in fund flows. 
There are different hypotheses linking changes in performance, risk, and flows 
into funds with the fee changes. For future performance, on one hand, increasing the fees 
should lower the net-of-fee returns while on the other hand; it should incentivize the 
                                                 
1 We measure performance both in terms of raw returns as well as risk-adjusted returns (in excess of the 
average returns of all funds following the same investment style). It is interesting to compare and contrast 
these findings with those in Warner and Wu (2010) study of changes in mutual fund advisory contracts. 
Unlike them, we find fee decreases to be much less prevalent and not associated with economies of scale. 
However, similar to their findings, we do observe fee increases in hedge funds to be driven by superior past 
performance. 5 
 
manager to exert effort which should be associated with higher net-of-fee returns.  Hence, 
the direction of the impact of changes in the fee structure on fund performance would 
depend on which of these two effects dominates.  
For future risk, we posit that an increase in incentive fees should lead to an 
increase in the risk taken by the fund due to the option feature of the contract. In contrast, 
an increase in management fee should be associated with a decrease in the risk borne by 
the fund as management fees can be viewed as perpetuity if the fund continues to be in 
business. Finally, for the relation between fee changes and changes in fund flows, we 
have two competing hypotheses. If fee changes are being used to control fund flows to 
mitigate problems of decreasing returns to scale and capacity constraints in the hedge 
fund industry, fee changes should be negatively related to changes in fund flows. In 
contrast, if fee changes are being used to signal managerial ability, it would predict a 
positive relation between fee changes and changes in fund flows. 
We have three major findings related to the effects of fee changes. First, we 
observe that fee changes are negatively related to changes in future fund performance. 
We had earlier found that fee increases are more likely than fee decreases, and that fee 
increases are more likely to be associated with younger and smaller funds following good 
performance. Taken together, these two results indicate that emerging hedge fund 
managers may be opportunistically increasing their fees after superior performance only 
to deliver worse performance in the future.  
Second, we find that changes in fee are associated with reduction in risk in the 
future. Our data on the changes in the different components of fee structure shows that 
this finding is driven by an increase in the management fee, which should be related to 6 
 
dampening of risk-taking behavior as the cash flows from management fee are akin to 
perpetuity if the fund continues to survive.  
Finally, we show that flows into funds increase in the year following the fee 
changes. This finding is consistent with fee changes being more consistent with signaling 
by fund managers about their abilities rather than fee changes being used to control flows 
into the funds. Since the future performance of funds that increase fees does not improve, 
this result at first sight may convey that investors may not be rational. However, there is a 
caveat here. Given that most fee changes occur during 2009 and 2010, the last two years 
of our sample period, it is possible that investors may withdraw their capital in a longer 
period, after meeting the redemption period and notice period requirements. This would 
be interesting to examine with the availability of longer time-series data in the future. 
Our findings have practical implications for both academics and practitioners 
alike. They suggest that fund managers opportunistically increase fund fees following 
good performance but do not decrease their fees subsequent to poor performance. This 
raises the question why investors do not participate in downward negotiation of fees. One 
possibility is that decrease in fees may not help the managers raise more capital if 
investors view it is a bad signal about future performance. 
Our paper extends the work of Schwarz (2007) in four important ways. First, as 
opposed to his largely cross-sectional study, we focus on time-series analysis of fee 
changes, and its consequences for future performance, risk-taking behavior, and investor 
reaction in terms of capital flows. Second, instead of inferring the changes in fees from 
annual snapshots of Lipper TASS database, our data allows us to precisely identify not 
only the date of changes in management and incentive fees but also addition and removal 7 
 
of high-water mark provision, which has been shown to be important for performance 
and risk-taking behavior of hedge funds (e.g., Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003), 
Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), Panageas and Westerfield (2009), and Ray (2010)). 
Third, our data allows us to look at the prevalence, causes, and effects of multiple 
changes in fees occurring simultaneously (i.e. changes to one or more of the components 
of the fee structure: incentive fee, management fee and HWM feature). Finally, more 
refined data enables us to capture situations where a fund changes fees during the earlier 
part of its appearance in hedge fund database. 
Among empirical work pertaining to mutual fund fees, the closest study to ours is 
Warner and Wu (2010), who study changes in mutual fund advisory compensation. They 
find fee increases to be associated with good past performance and fee decreases to be 
associated with economies of scale. Our study differs in that we examine fee changes in 
hedge funds, which in contrast to mutual funds, have different components in their fee 
structure that can change simultaneously and can have different implications for 
performance and risk-taking behavior. Finally, we examine the impact of fee changes on 
operational characteristics of funds after the fee change.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the 
related literature to develop testable hypotheses. Section III describes the data. Section IV 
presents our findings on the factors driving the changes in the fee structure of hedge 
funds. Section V provides evidence on how fee changes influence the changes in the 
fund’s future performance and risk-taking behavior, and how investors respond to the fee 




II.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
We now discuss prior theoretical and empirical literature that helps us develop 
competing hypotheses related to determinants of fee changes. 
II.A  Hypotheses for determinants of fee changes  
II.A.1  Are fee changes largely to adjust incentives?  
Christoffersen (2001) studies the phenomenon of mutual fund managers 
voluntarily waiving their fees. She argues that the selective waiving of the fees creates a 
performance-based payout for the manager. Specifically, fund managers waive fees 
following poor performance to increase net-of-fee returns, and take fees when returns are 
good. This finding for mutual funds, if applicable in case of hedge funds, motivates our 
first hypothesis that hedge funds should decrease (increase) their fees after poor (good) 
performance. We test this hypothesis by relating the fee changes to past fund 
performance.  
II.A.2  Are changes in fees used to control investor flows to maximize investor returns? 
Christoffersen and Musto (2002) show empirically that mutual fund pricing 
depends on demand sensitivity. They find that following poor returns and outflows, funds 
with retail investors actually increase fees for the remainder of their investors assuming 
that these remaining investors are price insensitive.
2 They document that for funds with 
institutional investors, this effect is not there indicating that institutional investors are 
largely price sensitive. Overall, their results suggest a negative relation between fee 
increases and past fund flows.  
                                                 
2 Gil-Bazo et al. (2009) also suggests a level of price insensitivity among mutual fund investors. 9 
 
In contrast, Bris et al. (2009) document a positive relation between fee increases 
and past fund flows. In their study of open-ended mutual funds that close for new 
investments between 1993 and 2004, they show that funds close after good performance 
and large inflows, while simultaneously raising their fees. Unlike mutual funds, hedge 
funds have mechanisms other than closing the fund for new investments to control flows. 
These include features such as lockup period and redemption period that restrict the flows 
out of the funds. Hence, compared to mutual funds, hedge funds are perhaps less likely to 
use fee increases to reduce inflows to mitigate the problem of decreasing returns to scale 
and/or capacity constraints that can hurt future performance of hedge funds (Naik, 
Ramadorai, and Stromqvist (2007), Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008)).  
Both the possibilities discussed in Christoffersen and Musto (2002) and Bris et al. 
(2009) can coexist in hedge funds and the eventual relation between fee changes and past 
fund flows will depend on which of these two effects dominates.  
II.A.3  Are changes in fees used to expropriate surplus from the investment relationship? 
An alternative to our second hypothesis would be that hedge funds increase their 
fees following good performance but do not decrease their fees following poor 
performance to expropriate surplus from their investors. This hypothesis would predict a 
positive relation between good past performance and fee changes. 
II.A.4  Do fee changes correspond to a “feeling out period” before funds settle on a final 
fee structure for learning purposes or other reasons? 
Given the highly competitive nature of the hedge fund business and the 
uncertainty associated with whether a fund that starts will be able to survive and do well, 
it is conceivable that hedge funds may start with low management fees and/or incentive 10 
 
fees. As the managers learn more about their abilities over time, they change their fees in 
line with their performance. This hypothesis would be supported by prevalence of fee 
changes earlier in a fund’s life when the fund is small. 
II.B  Hypotheses related to how fee changes affect future performance, risk, and flows 
into hedge funds 
Having discussed the different hypotheses related to determinants of fee changes, 
we next develop hypotheses on how the fee changes relate to fund’s future performance, 
to future risk, and to fund flows in the future. In the case of mutual funds, Golec and 
Starks (2004) find support for changes in fee structure driving risk-taking incentives 
when mutual funds were exogenously forced to remove asymmetric performance-based 
fees due to regulatory reasons. Prior literature related to hedge funds (Chakraborty and 
Ray (2008), Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), Panageas and Westerfield (2009), and 
Ray (2010)) suggests that hedge fund compensation contract affects fund manager 
incentives to exert effort and take risk, which  in turn naturally affect the investor’s 
decision to invest. Therefore, any changes in the fee structure should have implications 
both for the future performance, risk-taking behavior, and net inflows.  
II.B.1  Fee changes and future performance  
For future performance, on one hand, increasing the fees should lower the net-of-
fee returns while on the other hand; it should increase incentives for the manager to exert 
effort, which should be associated with higher net-of-fee returns.  Hence, the direction of 
the impact of changes in the fee structure would depend on which of these two effects 
dominates.  
II.B.2  Fee changes and future risk  11 
 
For future risk, we posit that an increase in incentive fees should lead to an 
increase in the risk taken by the fund due to the option feature of the contract. In contrast, 
an increase in management fee should be associated with a decrease in the risk borne by 
the fund as management fees can be viewed as perpetuity if the fund continues to be in 
business.  
II.B.2  Fee changes and future fund flows  
As we discuss earlier, one of the motivations for fee changes can be to control the 
fund flows to mitigate problems of decreasing returns to scale and capacity constraints in 
the hedge fund industry. If this argument is supported in the data, we posit that fee 
changes should be negatively related to changes in fund flows. In contrast, fee increases 
after good performance can be viewed by the investors as a signal of managerial ability, 
which should be associated with increase in fund flows as investors rationally respond to 
good performance. Hence, fee changes as a signaling mechanism would predict a positive 
relation between fee changes and changes in fund flows. 
In the table below, we summarize each of the factors above and our hypotheses on 
how they will influence the determinants of fee changes and the consequences of fee 
changes for future performance, risk, and flows from investors. Determinants are denoted 
with a “D” and a specific operational characteristic. For example, if fee changes adjusted 
incentives, we would expect past performance increases (decreases) to be associated with 
an overall increase (decrease) in fees, and specific increases (decreases) in incentive fees 
and management fees. Effects are denoted with an “E” and the characteristic. Positive 
(negative) sign in the fee or high-water mark (HWM) section would indicate how we 
would expect the characteristic to change given an increase or decrease in the fee (or in 12 
 
some cases, any change in the fees) or the addition or removal of the HWM. For example, 
if fee changes adjusted incentives, we would expect an increase (a decrease) in incentives 
fees to an increase (a decrease) in risk, an increase (a decrease) in management fees to a 
decrease (an increase) in risk and an addition (removal) of the HWM feature to a 
decrease (an increase) in risk. Blanks cells do not have an explicit empirical prediction 
associated with them.  
  13 
 
Summary of hypothesized determinants and effects of fee changes 
 
Factors and hypotheses  Fees  IF  MF  HWM 
Hypothesis 1: Fee changes to adjust incentives 
D: Past performance  + + +   
E: Risk shifting    +     
Hypothesis 2: Fees changes to control investor flows to maximize investor returns 
D: Past inflows high  + + +   
E: Inflows 
     
 
E: Performance  +   
Hypothesis 2A: Fees changes to expropriate surplus 
D: Good past performance   + + +   
E: Performance 
     
 
E: Inflows  
     
 
Hypothesis 3: Fee changes correspond to a “feeling out period” 
D: Fund Age       
 
D: Fund Size at Inception       
 
 





This study uses data from the Lipper TASS database that includes monthly net-of-
fee returns and assets under management of hedge funds, along with their characteristics 
such as inception date, lockup period, notice and redemption periods, management fee, 
incentive fee, and high-water mark provision at a point in time. Although Lipper TASS 
data has been widely used in a large number of hedge fund studies (e.g., Fung and Hsieh 
(2000, 2004), Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004), Hasanhodzic and Lo (2007), 
Avramov, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2011)), we are the first to use the fee-change data, 
which is proprietary and tracks fee changes by funds reporting to TASS at a daily level. 
Fee-change data includes changes in incentive fees and management fees, and addition 
and removal of the high-water mark feature. Data on the fee changes is only available 
since 04/17/2008 when Lipper took over the TASS database. As a result, the sample 
period of our study starts in April 2008 and ends in November 2010, the last month for 
which fee-change data is available. 
We aggregate fee changes at a monthly level and merge the fee changes with the 
monthly return and assets under management data. For our analysis, we restrict the 
sample to hedge funds denominated in US dollars. We exclude the return history of the 
funds before their entry into the Lipper TASS database to control for backfilling bias.  
We start by reporting the summary statistics on the fee changes in Table I. Panel 
A shows that out of the 3,770 funds in our sample, 292 funds had one change in the fee 
structure (either in incentive of management fees or the high-water mark feature), 11 
funds had 2 changes, and 1 fund had 3 fee changes, all adding up to a total of 315 
changes during our sample period between April 2008 and November 2010. Panels B and 15 
 
C tabulate the number of different types of changes in the fee structure including increase 
or decrease in management and/or incentive fees, and addition or removal of the high-
water mark provision. From Panel B, we observe that fee increases (either in incentive 
fee or management fee or both) are more prevalent than fee decreases (203 versus 25 
cases out of the total 315 changes in the fee structure). Additionally, we also notice that 
most fee changes involve changes in more than one component of the fee structure 
(management fee, incentive fee and high-water mark feature) at the same time. We 
examine the simultaneous changes in these different components in our empirical 
analysis to follow.  
Panel C provides the frequency of increases and decreases in management fee and 
incentive fee, and addition or removal of high-water mark feature. Panel D shows the 
number of fee changes month by month during our sample period. Panels E and F show 
the exact magnitudes of fee changes for incentive and management fees, respectively. A 
number of the fee changes involve raising either the incentive or management fee from 
zero to a positive number. For example, out of the 191 (129) cases of changes in 
incentive (management) fees, we find 177 (75) correspond to an increase in incentive 
(management) fees from zero to a positive number. To confirm that these are real fee 
changes and not some artifact of new funds entering their fees into Lipper TASS database 
with a delay, we replicate these tables after grouping funds by their age at the time of fee 
change. A similar pattern can be seen for all fee changes across different age groups, 
indicating that fee changes are not due to the delay in reporting by hedge funds (results 
not reported in the table).  We interpret the preponderance of fee increases as evidence 16 
 
consistent with our hypothesis that there is a “feeling out” period where fund managers 
learn about their abilities before settling on a final fee structure. 
Next, we compare the characteristics of the funds that exhibit fee changes with the 
funds with no changes in the fee structure. Table II provides the summary statistics on 
fund fees (incentive fee and management fee) and high-water mark for the original 
contract of the fund manager at the beginning of the sample period. Table II also reports 
the summary statistics of the operational characteristics of funds including their raw 
returns, logarithm of the assets under management (AUM) (in $ millions), percentage net 
inflows, and months in operation (or age) for the fund-month observations for which the 
data is available. Results in Table II show that funds with fee changes tend to have lower 
initial fees, lower incidence of use of high-water mark feature, better returns, lower AUM, 
and higher net inflows than their counterparts that do not have fee changes. These 
differences are both economically and statistically significant and provide preliminary 
support for some of our hypotheses. In particular, these univariate results are consistent 
with our hypotheses that fee changes are related to adjustment in incentives, controlling 
the fund flows, expropriation of surplus, and feeling out period following fund’s launch.  
In the following section, we examine the determinants of fee changes using 
multivariate regression analysis to test our hypotheses after controlling for other variables.  
 
IV.  Determinants of fee changes 
 
Univariate results in the previous section indicate that funds that show changes in 
the fee structure are inherently different from those that do not exhibit such changes. In 
this section, we conduct a multivariate analysis by estimating the following cross-
sectional logistic regression at the fund level after controlling for different fund 17 
 
characteristics such as management and incentive fees at fund’s inception, inception year, 
redemption notice period, lockup period, payout period, and assets under management at 




Fee Change Initial Incentive Fee Initial Management Fee
Inception Year Size + Redemption Notice Period










  (1) 
whereFee Changei is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the fund i 
changes any component of its fee structure (incentive fee, management fee, or high-water 
mark feature) at any time during our sample period and 0 otherwise, Initial Incentive Feei 
and Initial Management Feei are the incentive fee and management fee of fund i at 
inception, Inception Yeari is the year in which fund i was started, Redemption Notice 
Periodi,  Lockup Periodi and  Payout Periodi are the redemption notice period, lockup 
period, and payout period for fund i,
3 Sizeiis the size of the fund measured as the natural 
logarithm of the assets under management (AUM) for fund i, and  i  is the error term. 
We report the results in Panel A of Table III. We find negative and highly 
significant slope coefficients on both initial incentive fee and initial management fee 
(coeff. = 0.153 and 0.768; t-stats = 11.162 and 4.937 respectively).
4 In addition, we 
observe the slope coefficient on inception year is positive and significant (coeff. = 0.102; 
t-stat=6.463) while the coefficient on fund size is negative and significant at a 10% level 
(coeff. = 0.069; t-stat = 1.955). Taken together, these findings are consistent with our 
                                                 
3 Redemption notice period refers to the notice investors need to provide to the managers for withdrawing 
their money, payout period is the time period before an investor will receive cash back, and lockup period 
refers to the period for which the investments are locked before first withdrawal. These definitions are 
provided in the Lipper TASS questionnaire: http://tass.lipperweb.com/LipperTASSQuestionnaire.xls.  
4 Throughout the paper, unless noted otherwise, we cluster the standard errors both at the fund and time 
levels to estimate the t-statistics (see Petersen (2009)). 18 
 
hypothesis that fee changes are related to a feeling out period where smaller funds that 
initially start with lower incentive fee and management fee tend to increase their fees as 
their managers learn about their abilities. We also notice that restrictions on capital 
withdrawal (redemption notice period and lockup period) are positively related to fee 
changes. This is consistent with these restrictions being positively correlated with fee 
changes, another mechanism for controlling fund flows.  
Our cross-sectional analysis so far focuses on fund characteristics at the time of 
inception that are associated with fee changes. This does not allow us to test alternative 
hypotheses for which we need to introduce the time-varying operational characteristics of 
funds such as past performance, fund flows, and total or idiosyncratic risks. For this 
purpose, we estimate the following panel regression where include time-varying 
independent variables such as past inflows, returns, and risk-taking behavior of funds: 
,0 1 ,2 3 , 1
45 , 1
6, 1 ,
Fee Change Size Time Annual Inflows
Aggregate HF Inflows Annual Returns
Total Risk














where , Fee Changeimis an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the fund i 
changes any component of its fee structure (incentive fee, management fee, or high-water 
mark feature) during month m and 0 otherwise, , Sizeimis the size of the fund measured as 
the natural logarithm of the assets under management (AUM) for fund i during month m, 
Timem  is a trend variable that takes a value of 1 for the first month in our sample period 
and increases by 1 thereafter for every subsequent month,  ,1 Annual Inflowsim   are the net 
inflows for fund i over the last 12 months ending in month m expressed as a percentage 
of AUM at the beginning of the 12-month period, Aggregate HF Inflowsm  are  the 19 
 
aggregate monthly net inflows over month m expressed as a percentage of total AUM for 
all hedge funds in the sample,  ,1 Annual Returnsim   and  ,1 Total Riskim  are the net returns 
and standard deviation of monthly returns over the last 12 months for fund i as of 
previous month m-1, and  , im  is the error term.  
We report the results in Table III, Panel B column 1, labeled “Fund Period (1)”, of 
Table III. Trailing annual fund returns are positively related to fee changes (coeff. = 
0.929; t-stat = 3.113), which is consistent with both our hypotheses of fee changes being 
motivated by adjustment of incentives and expropriation of surplus by the fund manager. 
Slope coefficient on time is positive and significant (coeff. = 0.067; t-stat = 3.084) 
suggesting that there is an upward trend in the fee changes during our sample period. We 
do not find support for the hypothesis that fee changes are used to control flows as the 
relation between fee changes and trailing inflows is not significant. 
We repeat our analysis with risk-adjusted performance and report the results in 
column 2, labeled “Fund Period (2)”, of Table III. For this purpose, we replace raw 
performance with risk-adjusted fund performance, and replace total risk with the 
idiosyncratic risk in the regression in equation (2). For computing risk-adjustment 
performance and idiosyncratic risk, we regress the fund’s monthly raw returns over a 12-
month period on the monthly returns of all funds following the same investment style as 
that of the fund. Risk-adjusted performance and the idiosyncratic risk are the intercept 
and standard deviation of the residuals from this regression. Corroborating our prior 
finding using raw returns, we continue to observe a positive relation between fee changes 
and past performance when we use risk-adjusted performance (coeff. = 1.958; t-stat = 
4.515). Additionally, the coefficient on trailing idiosyncratic risk is now significant at the 20 
 
10% level (coeff. = 0.096; t-stat = 1.805), while results for other independent variables 
remain qualitatively similar. 
IV.A Determinants  of  specific fee changes 
 
Until now, we did not differentiate between the different types of fee changes in 
our analysis. As we mentioned before, the three components of the fee structure  
management fees, incentive fees, and high-water mark provision, tend to be altered 
simultaneously. Furthermore, we did not examine fee increases and fee decreases 
separately to see if there is any asymmetric relation between the fee changes and fund’s 
operational characteristics such as past performance, inflows, risk, and size. We examine 
these issues by estimating the following panel regressions:  
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where , Fee Increaseim,  , Fee Decreaseim, and  , Add HWMim are indicator variables 
that takes a value of 1 if the fund i increases, decreases, and adds a high-water mark 
feature respectively in its fee structure during month m and 0 otherwise, and 
,, , , , and  im im im   are the error terms. The specific combinations of fee changes 
constituting fee increases and decreases can be found in Table I, Panel B. Other variables 
are as defined previously in equation (2). 
We report our estimates from regressions (3) and (4) in Panel A of Table IV. 
Results in column (1) show that fee increases are more likely when the excess returns 21 
 
over other funds following the same investment style are higher (coefficient on trailing 
excess returns = 2.139; t-stat = 5.243) and when the idiosyncratic risk associated with 
these returns is low (coefficient on trailing idiosyncratic risk= 0.123; t-stat = 2.004). In 
contrast, results in column (2) do not show any relation between trailing excess returns 
and risk and fee decreases. However, there is a negative relation between aggregate 
hedge fund inflows and fee decreases that indicates that funds tend to be less likely to 
decrease their fees when there is lot of money pouring into the hedge fund industry. It is 
important to note here that we observe much fewer cases of fee decreases compared to 
fee increases in our sample (25 versus 203; see Panel B of Table II). Hence, lack of 
relation between past performance and fee decreases could also be simply due to lack of 
power due to fewer observations. Fee increases following superior past risk-adjusted 
performance support our hypotheses of fee changes being used to adjust the incentives of 
the fund managers and allowing the managers to expropriate the surplus.  
We also examine the determinants of the most common types of specific fee 
changes, as described in Table I, Panel B. These include (a) adding the HWM feature, (b) 
adding HWM and increasing incentive fees, (c) adding HWM, increasing incentive fees 
and management fees, (d) increasing only incentive fees, (e) increasing both incentive 
fees and management fees, and (f) increasing only management fees. The results from the 
logistic regressions for each of these types of fee increases are presented in columns (1) 
to (5) of Table IV Panel B.  
The most notable finding is that positive relation between trailing excess returns 
and three out of the five types of fee increases. Comparing these results with those in 
column (1) of Table IV Panel A, we observe that positive relation between fee increases 22 
 
and past excess returns is driven by the three cases: adding HWM accompanied by 
increases in incentive fees or increases in both management and incentive fees, and 
increasing only management fees. It is interesting to note that investors do not accept 
increases in management and incentive fees without the addition of HWM to curb the 
possibility of fund managers increasing their risk-taking behavior following the fee 
increases. 
Another result in this table is the negative relationship between future risk-taking 
behavior and fee changes. In particular, in cases where funds want to increase incentive 
fees without increasing management fees, they must have a demonstrated history of 
lower risk taking to assuage investors’ fears regarding increased risk-taking as a result of 
higher incentive fees. Management fee, by their perpetuity nature, serve as a natural 
counterweight to the increased risk taking incentives arising from increased incentive 
fees (see Panageas and Westerfield (2008) and Chakraborty and Ray (2008)), thus such 
fee changes do not require a similar track record of low risk.  
Overall, the findings in this section provide support to three out of the four 
hypotheses. First, the evidence suggests that funds increase (decrease) their fees 
following superior (inferior) performance, lending support to both our hypotheses: fee 
changes are associated with adjustment of incentives and expropriation of surplus by the 
fund managers. Second, we also observe that fee changes are more likely to be made 
during the early part of a fund’s life. Further, incentive fee increases (decreases) when the 
initial incentive fee is low (high). This finding resonates well with our hypothesis that 
there may be a feeling out period when the funds adjust their fees as the managers learn 
about their abilities.  23 
 
 
V.  Relation between fee changes, future performance, risk-taking behavior, and 
fund flows 
Having examined the determinants of fee changes, the next natural step is to 
examine how the fee changes influence future performance and risk-taking behavior of 
fund managers, and how the investors respond to the fee changes in terms of capital 
inflows into the funds. We analyze these issues in this section, starting with analyzing the 
effect of fee changes on fund performance. 
V.A  Fee changes and future performance 
We have two competing hypotheses regarding how fee changes may be related to 
future performance. If fee changes are motivated by the desire of the fund managers to 
control fund flows then one would expect to observe fee changes being associated with 
better future performance. In contrast, if fee changes are a mechanism for fund managers 
to expropriate surplus then future performance would be worse. To disentangle between 
these two competing hypotheses, we regress the difference between the annual returns of 
the fund before and after the fee changes on an indicator variable, fee change dummy, 
controlling for changes in the total risk and year fixed effects.  
Our findings in column 1 of Table V show a statistically significant negative 
coefficient (coeff. = 0.130; t-stat = 3.364) on the fee change dummy indicating support 
for the expropriation hypothesis. We also report the results for the specific types of fee 
increases as we did previously in Table IV. For three out of the six types of fee increases, 
we continue to observe fee change dummy to be significantly negative, again confirming 
the support for the expropriation hypothesis.  24 
 
We repeat the tests using the difference in excess returns (in excess of the average 
returns of all funds following the same investment style) around the fee change instead of 
raw returns. In line with this change in the dependent variable, instead of change in the 
total risk, we include change in idiosyncratic risk as the control variable. We report our 
findings in Table VI. Again, we observe a negative relation between change in fund’s 
risk-adjusted performance and fee changes, regardless of whether we use any fee change 
(column 1), or specific types of fee increases (columns 2-7). These findings continue to 
provide support to our hypothesis that fee changes, mostly in form of fee increases, are 
associated with worse future performance, suggesting fund managers strategically 
increasing their fees after good performance only to expropriate the surplus and deliver 
worse performance in the future. 
V.B  Fee changes and future fund flows 
We have two hypotheses regarding how future fund flows will change with the 
changes in the funds’ fee structure. If fee changes are used to control fund flows then one 
would expect to observe changes in fund flows to be negatively related to fee changes. In 
other words, fee increases (decreases) should be associated with lower (higher) fund 
flows in the future. In contrast, if fee changes are used to expropriate surplus and 
investors respond rationally to this behavior of the fund managers, then we should expect 
to see a negative relation between changes in fund flows and any fee change. To 
disentangle between these two competing hypotheses, we regress the difference between 
the annual percentage fund flows before and after the fee changes on an indicator variable, 
fee change dummy, controlling for changes in performance and total risk, and year fixed 
effects.  25 
 
Our findings in column 1 of Table VII show a statistically significant positive 
coefficient (coeff. = 0.320; t-stat = 2.263) on the fee change dummy indicating support 
for our hypothesis that fee changes are used to control the fund flows. As before, we also 
report the results for the specific types of fee increases. For two out of the six types of fee 
increases, we continue to observe fee change dummy to be significantly positive. This 
does not comport with either of our hypotheses. One possible explanation for these 
increases in inflows following fee increases could relate to the marketing efforts that may 
accompany fee changes. It may be possible that funds publicize impending fee increases 
that may already be reflecting in the Lipper TASS database and give investors “one last 
chance” to get in under the old fee regime, leading to this consistent increase in inflows.  
V.C  Fee changes and future risk-taking behavior of funds 
For changes in the future risk-taking behavior of hedge funds, we have different 
predictions depending on the type of fee change. Given the asymmetric option-like 
feature of incentive fee contract, an increase (decrease) in incentive fees should be 
associated with an increase (decrease) in the risk-taking behavior (Goetzmann, Ingersoll, 
and Ross (2003), Hodder and Jackwerth (2007)). In contrast to incentive fee, 
management fee is like perpetuity if the hedge fund continues to be in business. 
Therefore, an increase in management fee should attenuate the risk-taking behavior of 
fund managers as they would not favor increasing the risk to raise the probability of 
fund’s liquidation and lose the steady stream of cash flows from the management fees. 
Finally, adding high-water mark (HWM) can also reduce the risk-taking incentives for 
the fund managers as HWM can be considered as a sequence of options with changing 
strike price. Panageas and Westerfield (2009) show that in presence of HWM, even a 26 
 
risk-neutral manager will not place an unboundedly large weight on the risky asset 
despite the option-like feature of the incentive contract. We test for these different 
hypotheses by regressing the difference between return standard deviation over twelve 
months before and after the fee changes on an indicator variable, fee change dummy, 
while controlling for changes in performance and year fixed effects.  
Our findings in column 1 of Table VIII show a statistically significant negative 
coefficient (coeff. = 0.410; t-stat = 2.260) on the fee change dummy. Since we expect 
a positive relation between changes in incentive fee and changes in risk, and a negative 
relation between either changes in management fees or adding HWM and change in risk, 
the net effect being negative suggests that change in management fees and/or adding 
HWM dominate change in incentive fee as the specific type of fee change. We verify that 
this indeed is the case by examining six types of fee changes for which we report the 
results in columns (2) to (7) in Table VIII. The first thing to note is that except one 
category of increasing the incentive fees alone, remaining five categories of fee changes 
either include adding HWM and/or increasing the management fees. This suggests that 
investors perhaps do not usually accept increases in incentive fees unless it is 
accompanied by changes in the other two components of the fee structure to mitigate the 
risk-taking behavior. Consistent with our hypothesis, we observe that all the three types 
of fee changes with increase in management fees show a significant negative relation 
with the change in the risk, i.e., increase in management fees is associated with decrease 
in risk (coeff. = 0.863; t-stat = 3.209 in column 4, coeff. = 0.740; t-stat = 1.985 in 





In this paper, we provide evidence of hedge fund managers increasing their fees 
more often than decreasing their fees. We observe that these fee increases tend to be more 
prevalent in younger and smaller funds, whose managers seem to be opportunistic in their 
behavior as they tend to increase fees following good performance but then fail to deliver 
superior performance in the future. Investors respond rationally to superior past 
performance, viewing the fee increases as a signal of managerial ability, and reward these 
funds with greater flows. These findings raise a puzzling question about the lack of 
downward revisions in fee structure as one would expect in a competitive industry, 
especially for those funds that perform poorly. We believe that a partial explanation for 
this puzzle may be that decrease in fees may not necessarily benefit the managers. 
Investors can view this as a negative signal and restrain from flocking to such funds even 
if they charge less. These issues are being investigated as a part of our ongoing research 
agenda. 
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Table I: Fee change summary statistics 
 
Panel A reports the number of funds with different number of fee changes. Panel B reports the exact nature 
of these changes, sorted by how prevalent the change is. Different types of fee changes include removal of 
high-water mark (HWM) provision (HWM down), addition of HWM provision (HWM up), decrease and 
increase in management fees (Mfee down and Mfee up), and decrease and increase in incentive fees (Ifee 
down and Ifee up). For example, of the 315 changes in the fee structure, 75  involved adding a HWM 
feature only (and no changes to the other features). The last two columns of Panel B show if the changes in 
the fee structure correspond to increase or decrease in fee. Fee increases (decreases) are marked as “Y” (yes) 
if either management fee or incentive fee or both types of fee increase (decrease), exlcuding conflicting 
cases such as management fee increases (decreases) and incentive fee decreases (increases). Panel C reports 
a summation of all fee increases and decreases as  well as incidence of addition/removal of the HWM 
feature. Panel D reports the distribution of these changes over calendar time in our sample. Panel E reports 
incentive fees before and after fee changes, in cases where incentive fees were changed and Panel F reports 




No changes  3,466  91.94 
One change  290  7.75 
Two changes  11  0.29 




down HWM  up 
Mfee 
down Mfee  up 
Ifee 







0 1 0 0 0 0  75  23.81     
0 1 0 0 0 1  60  19.05  Y  
0 1 0 1 0 1  49  15.56  Y  
0 0 0 0 0 1  41  13.02  Y  
0 0 0 1 0 1  25  7.94  Y  
0 0 0 1 0 0  23  7.3  Y  
0 0 1 0 0 0 9  2.86   Y 
0 1 1 0 0 0 6  1.9  Y 
1 0 0 0 0 0 6  1.9    
0 1 0 1 0 0 5  1.59  Y  
0 0 1 0 1 0 4  1.27   Y 
0 0 0 0 1 0 3  0.95   Y 
0 1 1 0 0 1 3  0.95     
0 0 1 0 0 1 2  0.63     
0 0 0 1 1 0 1  0.32     
0 1 1 0 1 0 1  0.32   Y 
1 0 0 0 1 0 1  0.32   Y 
1 0 1 0 1 0 1  0.32   Y 
            Total          315                            203             25
    
Panel C 
Increase/Add Decrease/Remove 
Incentive Fee    180  11 
Management Fee   103  26 
HWM 199  8 31 
 
Panel D 
Year  \  Month  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  12  Total 
2008  5 6  15  14 3 5 7 5 4  64 
2009  6 17  7  1  5 12  6 11 11  7  7 14  104 
2010  5  7 23 19 16 18 16  8 22 13  147 
Total  11 24 30 25 27 45 36 22 38 27 12 18  315 
 
Panel E – Incentive fees before and after change 
 


















IF  =  0%  0 4  8  0 11 4  136  14  177 
IF  =  10%  0  0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
IF  =  15%  0  0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
15  <  IF  <  20%  0  0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
IF  =  20%  2  0 1 0 5 0 0 1 9 
IF  >  20%  0  0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Total  2 4 10 1 17 4  138  15  191 
 
Panel F –Management fees before and after change 
 



















MF  =  0%  0 7  9  1 23 4 27 4 75 
0  <  MF  <  1%  0  1 2 0 5 1 2 1  12 
MF  =  1%  0  0 0 0 1 0 5 0 6 
1  <  MF  <  1.5%  0  2 1 0 0 1 0 0 4 
MF  =  1.5% 2  2 2 0 0 0 2 2  10 
MF  =  2%  0  4 5 0 4 0 0 5  18 
MF  >  2%  0  0 0 0 0 0 3 1 4 
Total  2  16 19 1 33 6 39  13  129 
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Table II: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A reports the means, standard deviations, and number of fund-month observations for funds that do not exhibit changes in their fee structures and 
operational characteristics while Panel B reports the same statistics for funds that have changes in their fee structures. Panel C reports the t-statistics from t-tests 
comparing the means of the different components of the fee structure (incentive fee, management fee, and high-water mark) and means of the operational 
characteristics (raw returns of the funds (Returns), logarithm of the assets under management in $ millions (log AUM), net inflow computed as the percentage net 
inflow based on the AUM in the previous period, and months in operation (or age of the fund in months)). Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is 
indicated by **,*, and + respectively. Our sample period is from April 2008 to November 2010.  
 
 
  Panel A – Funds without fee changes  Panel B – Fund with fee changes  Panel C – t-test 
  Mean  Std. Dev  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev  Obs.  Mean (fee change) –Mean (no fee change) 
Initial Incentive Fee   17.856  6.057  3,480  7.212  9.75  302  -10.357** (-154.05) 
Initial Management Fee   1.53  0.716  3,494  1.191  1.612  302  -0.394** (-43.03) 
Initial High-water Mark   0.758  0.429  3,504  0.116  0.32  302  -0.642** (-32.446) 
              
Returns   0.224  7.535  75,958  0.637  6.093  7,457  0.412** (4.588) 
Log AUM ($ millions)   3.634  1.94  55,359  3.321  1.796  4,485  -0.313** (-10.454) 
Net Inflow (%)  -0.006  0.107  53,192  0.005  0.121  4,219  0.011** (6.102) 




Table III: The determinants of a fee change 
 
This table provides the results of logistic regressions modelling the likelihood of a fund changing its fees. 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals to one if a fund changes its fees at 
any time over the sample period and zero if fund does not change its fees. The independent variables are 
incentive fee and management fee for the fund at the time of inception (Initial IFee and Initial MFee), year 
in which the fund was started (Inception Year), notice that investors need to provide for withdrawing their 
money (Redemption Notice Period), the period for which investments are locked up before first withdrawal 
(LockUp Period), time period before an investor will receive cash back (Pay Out Period), logarithm of 
assets under management (AUM) at inception (Log AUM at inception In Panel B, Column (1) and (2), the 
dependent variable is an indicator variable that equals to one if a fund changes its fees in month t and zero 
otherwise.). The independent variables are logarithm of assets under management (AUM), Time, which is 
the calendar time starting from 1 and increasing by 1 for each subsequent month, Trailing inflows are the 
net inflows into the fund over the last 12 months expressed as a percentage of AUM at the beginning of the 
year, Aggregate HF inflow are the aggregate monthly hedge fund inflows as a percentage of total AUM for 
all hedge funds in the sample, Trailing returns are fund’s raw returns over last 12 months, Trailing total risk 
is the standard deviation of fund’s raw returns over the last 12 months, Trailing excess returns are the 
fund’s raw returns over the average raw returns of all the funds following the same investment style over 
the last 12 months, Trailing idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residuals from regressing 
fund’s raw returns on the average raw returns of all funds following the same investment style over a 
period of 12 months. The standard errors are clustered at fund level and time level. The t-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by **,*, and + 
respectively. 
 
Panel A    Panel B 




Initial IFee  -0.153**    Log AUM  -0.012  -0.025 
 (-11.162)     (-0.188)  (-0.405) 
Initial MFee  -0.768**    Time 0.067**  0.073** 
 (-4.937)     (3.084)  (3.462) 
Inception Year  0.102**    Trailing Inflows  -0.179  -0.217 
 (6.463)     (-0.809)  (-0.997) 
RedemptionNoticePeriod 0.005**    Aggregate HF inflow  -3.259  -0.707 
 (2.868)     (-0.519)  (-0.112) 
LockUpPeriod 0.025*    Trailing Returns  0.929**   
 (2.083)     (3.113)   
PayOutPeriod -0.002    Trailing total risk  -0.045   
 (-0.411)     (-1.128)   
Log AUM at inception  -0.069+    Trailing excess return    1.958** 
 (-1.955)       (4.515) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.330    Trailing idiosyncratic  risk    -0.096+ 
N 2511       (-1.805) 
     Pseudo  R-squared  0.032  0.037 
     N  43855 43855 
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Table IV: The determinants of specific fee changes 
 
This table provides the results of logistic regressions modelling the likelihood of specifc fee changes. Panel 
A presents the determinants of fee increases, fee decreases, and addition of the high-water mark (HWM) 
feature where fee increase (decrease) relates to an increase (decrease) in management fee or incentive fee or 
both. Panel B shows details of determinants of common specific fee changes. The dependent variable is a 1 
if a fee change of the appropriate nature takes place in a given month and 0 otherwise. The key independent 
variables of interest are trailing inflows, trailing excess returns, aggregate HF inflows and trailing fund 
idiosyncratic risk, as defined in Table III. The standard errors are clustered at fund level and time level. The 
t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by **,*, 





       (1) 
Fee Increase 
        (2) 
Fee Decrease 
       (3) 
Add HWM 
Log AUM  -0.009  -0.015  -0.123 
 (-0.152)  (-0.059)  (-1.160) 
Time 0.087**  0.104*  0.035 
 (3.657)  (2.091)  (1.195) 
Trailing Inflows  -0.208  -0.486  0.045 
 (-1.235)  (-1.127)  (0.161) 
Aggregate HF inflow  13.179  -25.347+  -7.498 
 (1.052)  (-1.865)  (-0.661) 
Trailing  excess  return 2.139** 0.193  1.887* 
 (5.243)  (0.162)  (2.085) 
Trailing idiosyncratic risk  -0.123*  0.021  -0.145 
 (-2.004)  (0.851)  (-0.904) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.051  0.032  0.019 









Add HWM  




















Log  AUM  -0.123 -0.225*  -0.027 -0.053  0.393* 0.202 
  (-1.160) (-2.532) (-0.311) (-0.539)  (2.409)  (1.155) 
Time  0.035 0.226+  0.094*  0.064+ 0.009 0.105+ 
  (1.195) (1.647) (2.489) (1.902)  (0.187) (1.819) 
Trailing  Inflows  0.045  -0.181 -0.228 -0.279  -0.052 -0.431 
  (0.161)  (-0.512) (-0.501) (-0.443)  (-0.084) (-0.984) 
Aggregate HF inflow  -7.498  28.608  -7.692  117.471*  31.914  -10.372 
  (-0.661) (0.435)  (-0.669) (2.032)  (1.189)  (-0.382) 
Trailing  excess  return  1.887*  3.094** 2.639** 1.934  -1.798  2.601** 
  (2.085) (3.316) (5.631) (1.018)  (-1.470)  (3.684) 
Trailing idiosyncratic risk  -0.145  -0.365+  0.065  -0.455**  0.024  0.005 
  (-0.904) (-1.866) (0.686)  (-3.370)  (0.152)  (0.050) 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.019 0.132 0.054 0.068  0.037 0.057 




Table V: The effects of fee changes on returns 
 
This table provides the results of OLS regressions modelling the effects of fee changes on returns. The dependent variable is the difference between returns for 
the twelve months following the fee change and the returns during the twelve months preceeding the fee change. The key independent variable of interest is the 
fee change dummy which equals 1 if any fee change occurs during our sample period for column (1) and a specific type of fee change occurs during our sample 
period for columns (2) to (7). Other independent variables are change in total risk which is the difference in the return standard deviation before and after the fee 
change over a twelve-month period, and time dummies. The standard errors are clustered at fund level. The t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical 
significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by **,*, and + respectively. 
 
 
          (1) 
Any change 
       (2) 
Add HWM 
(3) 
Add HWM  
Ifee Up 




    (5) 
Ifee Up 
   (6) 
Ifee Up 
Mfee Up 
     (7) 
Mfee Up 
Fee change dummy  -0.130** -0.221**  -0.071  0.058  -0.098*  -0.134 -0.533** 
(-3.364)  (-3.179) (-0.747) (0.940)  (-2.006)  (-1.262)  (-2.900) 
Change in total risk  -0.043**  -0.043**  -0.043**  -0.043** -0.043** -0.043** -0.043** 
(-16.520)  (-16.478)  (-16.484)  (-16.480) (-16.481) (-16.479) (-16.483) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes
R-squared  0.247  0.247  0.247  0.247 0.247 0.247 0.247 
N  32919  32864  32855  32853 32857 32853 32849 
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Table VI: The effects of fee changes on excess returns 
 
This table provides the results of OLS regressions modelling the effects of fee changes on changes in funds’ excess returns. Excess returns are defined as fund’s 
raw returns minus the average returns of all funds following the same investment style. The dependent variable is the difference between fund’s excess returns 
over twelve months following the fee change and excess returns over twelve months preceeding the fee change. The key independent variable of interest is the 
fee change dummy which equals 1 if any fee change occurs during our sample period for column (1) and a specific type of fee change occurs during our sample 
period for columns (2) to (7). Other independent variables are change in idiosyncratic risk which is the difference in the standard deviation of residuals (from 
regressing fund’s returns on average returns of all funds following the same investment style) before and after the fee change over a twelve-month period, and 
time dummies. The standard errors are clustered at fund level. The t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is 
indicated by **,*, and + respectively. 
 
 
         (1) 
Any change 
      (2) 
Add HWM 
      (3) 
Add HWM Ifee 
Up 




    (5) 
Ifee Up 
    (6) 
Ifee Up 
Mfee Up 
     (7) 
Mfee Up 
Fee change dummy  -0.085** -0.140**  -0.146*  -0.024 -0.109*  0.038  -0.178+ 
  (-3.050)  (-3.080) (-2.140) (-0.391)  (-2.293)  (0.335)  (-1.671) 
Change in idiosyncratic risk  -0.026**  -0.026**  -0.026**  -0.026** -0.026** -0.026** -0.026** 
  (-8.456)  (-8.425)  (-8.432)  (-8.428) (-8.422) (-8.432) (-8.427) 
Time dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes
R-squared  0.022  0.022  0.022  0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 
N  32919  32864  32855  32853 32857 32853 32849 
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Table VII: The effects of fee changes on risk 
 
This table provides the results of OLS regressions modelling the effects of fee changes on return risk. The dependent variable is the difference between return 
standard deviation during the twelve months following the fee change and the return standard deviation during the twelve months preceeding the fee change. The 
key independent variable of interest is the fee change dummy which equals 1 if any fee change occurs during our sample period for column (1) and a specific 
type of fee change occurs during our sample period for columns (2) to (7). Other independent variables are change in returns defined as the difference between 
returns for the twelve months following fee change and the annual fund returns during the 12 months preceeding the fee change, and time dummies. The standard 
errors are clustered at fund level (Petersen (2009)). The t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by 
**,*, and + respectively. 
 
 
      (1) 
Any change 
     (2) 
Add HWM 
    (3) 
Add HWM Ifee 
Up 




   (5) 
Ifee Up 
   (6) 
Ifee Up 
Mfee Up 
     (7) 
Mfee Up 
Fee change dummy  -0.410*  0.232  -0.484  -0.863**  0.148  -0.740*  -1.423+ 
  (-2.260)  (0.615)  (-1.320)  (-3.209) (0.326)  (-1.985) (-1.709) 
Change  in  returns  -1.185**  -1.183**  -1.183**  -1.183** -1.183** -1.183** -1.183** 
  (-16.251)  (-16.210)  (-16.217)  (-16.214) (-16.214) (-16.214) (-16.216) 
Time  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.307  0.307  0.307  0.307 0.307 0.307 0.307 
N  32919  32864  32855  32853 32857 32853 32849 
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Table VIII: The effects of fee changes on inflows 
 
This table provides the results of OLS regressions modelling the effects of fee changes on returns. The dependent variable is the difference between net inflow 
percentages for the twelve months following the fee change and the twelve months preceeding the fee change. The key independent variable of interest is the fee 
change dummy which equals 1 if any fee change occurs during our sample period for column (1) and a specific type of fee change occurs during our sample 
period for columns (2) to (7). Other independent variables are change in returns defined as the difference between returns for the twelve months following fee 
change and the annual fund returns during the 12 months preceeding the fee change, change in total risk defined as the difference between return standard 
deviation during the twelve months following the fee change and the return standard deviation during the twelve months preceeding the fee change, and time 
dummies. The standard errors are clustered at fund level. The t-statistics are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated 




      (1) 
Any change 
    (2) 
Add HWM 
    (3) 
Add HWM  
Ifee Up 




   (5) 
Ifee Up 
   (6) 
Ifee Up 
Mfee Up 
    (7) 
Mfee Up 
Fee change dummy  0.320*  0.235  0.039  0.602+  0.207**  -0.077  0.434 
  (2.263)  (0.890) (1.434) (1.895)  (2.918)  (-0.241)  (1.407) 
Change  in  returns  0.023  0.023  0.023  0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 
  (0.665)  (0.668)  (0.667)  (0.668) (0.667) (0.664) (0.670) 
Change in total risk   -0.010+  -0.010+  -0.010+  -0.010+ -0.010+ -0.010+ -0.010+ 
  (-1.799)  (-1.800)  (-1.796)  (-1.796) (-1.797) (-1.797) (-1.795) 
Time  dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  0.085  0.084  0.084  0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 
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